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We denote by Q the reference area of size Q m2. Our problem is to fully cover the area and to
provide certain level of QoS for users. There are two types of Base Stations (BS) that can be used for
this purpose. Macro-BSs that have large transmission ranges but their energy consumption is high, and
Femto-BSs that have smaller transmission ranges and relatively smaller energy consumption. Telecoms
service providers have full control over functionality of Macro-BSs, while Femto-BSs are acting more
phazy and are controlled by home service providers. Hence, from the point of view of a service provider,
Femto-BSs are unreliable. In practice, the full coverage would be provided by reliable Macro-BSs and
Femto-BSs would be mainly used to enhance the level of QoS in the network.
As discussed above, telecoms service providers have not control over functionality of Femto-BSs.
However, they can motivate home service providers to cooperate with them (e.g. activate their Femto-
BSs) by porpoising a reasonable price for service they provide. A home service provider can then evaluate
its utility according to the price proposed by the telecoms service provider and decide to cooperate if it
gets a positive utility. In this draft, we propose a pricing mechanism and evaluate the behavior of home
service providers (i.e., the number of active Femto-BSs) for a given price. We mainly focus our attention
on Nash equilibrium analysis.
I. GAME DESCRIPTION
Let N be the number of Femto-BSs in Q. We consider that Femto-BSs are uniformly and independently
distributed in the area. We divide time into slots of size one unit, where each Femto-BS can be active
or passive during a time slot. Femto-BS i’s decision, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , about whether to be active during a
time slot is determined by BS i’s strategy. We denote by xi(t) ∈ Ai = {0, 1} node i’s strategy during
time slot t, where i is active if xi(t) = 1 and passive otherwise. xi(t) is a function of p, where p is
the money paid to an active Femto-BS for serving a request (e.g. a session request). We consider that p
does’t change over time, i.e. we have a single shot game where the strategy of nodes is fixed. Hence,
for the sake of simplicity, we drop t from our notation.
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1Let r be the transmission range of a Femto-BS. Following policy is used to assign ‘active’ Macro and
Femto -BSs to arrived requests. When a request arrive, it randomly selects one of the active Femto-BSs
that can serve its request (the request must be in transmission range of a Femto-BS to be served by the
Femto-BS). If there is no such a Femto-BS, then the request would be served by one of the available active
Macro-BS. We consider that requests arrive according to a Poisson distribution with mean λ requests per
unit of time, where the position of arrivals are uniformly and independently distributed in Q. We denote
by σ the average size of requests.
We consider a linear model for the cost of energy consumed by an active Femto-BS during a time
slot:
ctotal = c+ ncs, (1)
where ctotal is the cost of total energy consumed by the Femto-BS, c > 0 is the cost of energy consumed
by an active Femto-BS when its traffic load is zero, cs > 0 is the marginal cost (e.g. energy cost) of
serving a request, and n is the total number of the requests served by the Femto-cell. We consider that
p > cs, as there is no incentive for Femto-BSs to serve a request if p ≤ cs. We consider that the energy
consumed by a passive Femto-BS is negligible and hence its cost.
Let s(h) be the ‘active’ Femto-BS chosen to serve the h-th request arrived during a time slot (s(h) = 0
if the request is served by a Macro-BS). Then, Femto-BS i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , gets utility p − cs if i = s(h)
and 0 otherwise, i.e.,
ui(x ∈ A, h) =
 p− cs if i = s(h)0 otherwise (2)
where A = A1 × A2 × · · · × AN denotes the set of strategy profiles of Femto-BSs. We denote by
ui(x) =
∑K
h=1 ui(x, h)− cxi the total utility received by Femto-BS i during the time slot, where K is
the total number of arrivals in the area. Note that if xi = 0 then ui(x, h) = 0 for any 1 ≤ h ≤ K and
hence ui(x) = 0. ui(x) = Kqi(p− cs)− c if xi = 1, where qi is the fraction of the arrived requests in
the area assigned to Femto-BS i. K and qi are independent random variables, hence the expected utility
per time slot received by Femto-BS i is
Ui(x) =
 λq¯i(p− cs)− c if xi = 10 otherwise (3)
where λ and q¯i are expected values of K and qi, respectively.
We denote by G(U,A) the game described above, where U(x) = (U1(x), U2(x), · · · , UN (x)) is the
payoff function for any x ∈ A. Our goal is to find Nash equilibrium of G(U,A) for a given price p. In
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2the next section, we consider a specific scenario that r is enough large such that Q is fully covered by
each of the Femto-BSs. We then extend our results to more general case where each Femto-BSs covers
only a subset of the area.
II. A SIMPLE SCENARIO: A CLIQUE
We first consider that r is large such that all the points in Q are covered by a Femto-BS. Let NA ≤ N
be the number of active Femto-BSs in the area, i.e. NA = |x| where x ∈ A is the strategy played by the
Femto-BSs. An arrived request could be served by any of these active Femto-BSs (the request randomly
selects one of them). Hence q¯i = 1NA is the expected fraction of arrivals in the area assigned to an active
Femto-BS when NA ≥ 1. Then, (3) can be simplified to
Ui(x) =
 λNA (p− cs)− c if xi = 10 otherwise (4)
Now let
N cA = min
(
max
(
0,
⌊
λ(p− cs)
c
⌋)
, N
)
(5)
where
⌊
λ(p−cs)
c
⌋
is the nearest integers less than or equal to λ(p−cs)c . N
c
A is the greatest value of NA ≤ N
such that Ui ≥ 0 if Ai = 1, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Theorem 1 x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2, · · · , x∗N ) ∈ A such that |x∗| =
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i = N
c
A is a Nash equilibrium of
G(U,A) for the scenario described in this section.
Proof: See Appendix .
Note that the set of Nash equilibriums given by this theorem might not be the set of all possible Nash
equilibriums of the game (see following theorem).
Theorem 2 If N cA > 0 and if
λ
NcA
(p − cs) − c = 0, then x∗ ∈ A such that |x∗| = N cA − 1 is a Nash
equilibrium of G(U,A) for the described scenario.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B
Let E1, E2 ⊂ A be respectively the set of Nash equilibriums given by Theorems 1 and 2. Note that
E2 = Φ if λNcA (p− cs)− c 6= 0 or if N
c
A = 0.
Theorem 3 E = E1 ∪ E2 contains all possible Nash equilibriums of G(U,A) for the scenario described
in this section.
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3Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
III. A NETWORK SETTING SCENARIO
In this section, we consider a more general scenario where r is small and hence a Femto-BS covers
only a subset of points in Q. As described in Section I, we consider that Femto-BS are uniformly and
independently distributed in the area. Similar to previous section, we use NA to denote the number of
active Femto-BSs in the area. Hence, NAQ is the density of active Femto-BSs per unit of area.
We define the ‘area coverage’ (fa) as the fraction of the geographical area covered by one or more
Femto-BS. It is shown in [1] that if the area is enough large, then
fa = 1− e−
NA
Q
pir2 . (6)
Recall that based on our assumptions, the position of Femto-BSs and arrivals are uniformly and
independently distributed in Q, and a user randomly selects its server from the set of active Femto-
BSs that can serve its request. Hence, the expected fraction of arrivals in the area assigned to an active
Femto-BS is q¯i = 1−e
−NApir2/Q
NA
. Using this results, (3) is simplified to
Ui(x) =

λ(1−e−NApir2/Q)
NA
(p− cs)− c if xi = 1
0 otherwise
(7)
First we prove following lemma.
Lemma 1 g(NA) = λ(1−e
−NApir2/Q)
NA
(p− cs)− c is a decreasing function in NA > 0.
Proof: See Appendix D.
We now define NnA = min(max(0, byc), N), where λ(1−e
−ypir2/Q)
y (p− cs)− c = 0. NnA is the greatest
value of NA < N such that
λ(1−e−NApir2/Q)
NA
(p − cs) − c ≥ 0. From Lemma 1 and following the same
argument used to prove Theorems 1, 2, and 3 we can prove following results.
Theorem 4 In a network setting, as described above, x∗ ∈ A such that |x∗| = NnA is a Nash equilibrium
of G(U,A).
Theorem 5 In the scenario described in this section, x∗ ∈ A such that |x∗| = NnA − 1 is a Nash
equilibrium of G(U,A) if NnA > 0 and if
λ(1−e−NnApir2/Q)
NnA
(p− cs)− c = 0.
Theorem 6 Let En ⊂ A be the set of Nash equilibriums given by Theorems 4 and 5, En contains all
possible Nash equilibriums of the game for the scenario described in this section.
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APPENDIX
A. Appendix A
We need to show that ∀i, xi ∈ Ai = {0, 1}, xi 6= x∗i : Ui(x∗i , x∗−i) ≥ Ui(xi, x∗−i), where x∗−i is the
strategy of all players except i. Note from (4) that Ui(x∗i , x
∗
−i) = 0 (resp. Ui(xi, x
∗
−i) = 0) if x
∗
i = 0
(resp. xi = 0).
We first consider the case that N cA = 0, i.e.
λ(p−cs)
c < 1. In this case x
∗ = (0, 0, · · · , 0) is a Nash
equilibrium as Ui(x∗i , x
∗
−i) = 0 and Ui(xi = 1, x
∗
−i) = λ(p − cs) − c < 0, i.e. Ui(x∗i , x∗−i) > Ui(xi =
1, x∗−i), for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
We then consider the case that 1 ≤ N cA ≤ N . For any 1 ≤ i ≤ N :
• If x∗i = 0, then Ui(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) = 0. Moreover, it is easy to show that
λ
NA
(p − cs) − c is a decreasing
function of NA > 0. Hence, from the definition of N cA we have Ui(xi = 1, x
∗
−i) =
λ
NcA+1
(p−cs)−c ≤
0. Thus, the utility of i would not increase if it switches to active mode.
• If x∗i = 1, then Ui(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) =
λ
NcA
(p − cs) − c ≥ 0 (this comes from the definition of N cA) and
Ui(xi = 0, x
∗
−i) = 0. Hence i would not get greater utility if it switches to passive mode.
The proof is completed.
B. Appendix B
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ N , let xi 6= x∗i ∈ {0, 1} and x∗−i be
the strategy of all players except i.
We first consider the case that N cA = 1. In this case x
∗ = (0, 0, · · · , 0) is the Nash equilibrium as
Ui(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) = 0 and Ui(xi = 1, x
∗
−i) = λ(p − cs) − c = 0, i.e. Ui(x∗i , x∗−i) = Ui(xi = 1, x∗−i), for any
1 ≤ i ≤ N .
We then consider the case that 2 ≤ N cA ≤ N . For any 1 ≤ i ≤ N :
• If x∗i = 0, then Ui(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) = 0 and Ui(xi = 1, x
∗
−i) =
λ
NcA
(p− cs)− c = 0. Thus i would not get
greater utility if it switches to active mode.
• If x∗i = 1, then Ui(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) =
λ
NcA−1(p− cs)− c ≥ 0 (this comes from the fact that
λ
NcA
(p− cs)− c
is a decreasing function of N cA > 0) and Ui(xi = 0, x
∗
−i) = 0. Hence, the utility of i would not
increase if it switches to passive mode.
The proof is completed.
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5C. Appendix C
Let x
′∗ /∈ E , x′∗ ∈ A, be a Nash equilibrium of the game and let ∣∣x′∗∣∣ = N ′ , then for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N
Ui(x
′∗) =

λ
N
′
A
(p− cs)− c if x′∗i = 1
0 otherwise
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ N , let xi 6= x′∗i ∈ {0, 1} and x
′∗
−i be the strategy of all players except i.
We first consider the case that N
′
A = 0, i.e. x
′∗ = (0, 0, · · · , 0). In this case Ui(x′∗i , x
′∗
−i) = 0 for all
1 ≤ i ≤ N . As x′∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the game, then Ui(xi = 1, x′∗−i) = λ(p− cs)− c ≤ 0. Using
(5), we have N cA = 0 and hence (0, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ E1 (see Theorem 1).
Now consider the case that 1 < N
′
A < N . Note that as 1 < N
′
A < N , there is at least one active
and at least one passive Femto-BSs in the area. Suppose 1 ≤ i ≤ N . From the definition of the Nash
equilibrium, we know that if x
′∗
i = 0, then Ui(x
′∗
i , x
′∗
−i) ≥ Ui(xi = 1, x
′∗
−i), i.e.
λ
N
′
A+1
(p − cs) − c ≤ 0.
If x
′∗
i = 1, then Ui(x
′∗
i , x
′∗
−i) ≥ Ui(xi = 0, x
′∗
−i) and hence
λ
N
′
A
(p− cs)− c ≥ 0.
• If λ
N
′
A+1
(p− cs)− c = 0, then N cA = N
′
A + 1 using (5). Applying Theorem 2, we can easily show
that x
′∗ ∈ E2.
• If λ
N
′
A+1
(p− cs)− c < 0, then N cA = N
′
A. It follows from the fact that
λ
N
′
A
(p− cs)− c ≥ 0 and is a
decreasing function of N
′
A. Then using Theorem 1, we have x
′∗ ∈ E1.
Finally, we consider the case that N
′
A = N . As x
′∗ = (1, 1, · · · , 1) is a Nash equilibrium of the game,
then Ui(x
′∗
i , x
′∗
−i) ≥ Ui(xi = 0, x
′∗
−i), i.e.
λ
N (p − cs) − c ≥ 0. Using (5), we have N cA = N and from
Theorem 1 we can show that x
′∗ ∈ E1.
The proof is completed.
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6D. Appendix D
We show that derivative of g(NA) with respect to NA is negative for any NA > 0
d
dNA
g(NA) = λ(p− cs)(NApir
2/Q)e−NApir2/Q − (1− e−NApir2/Q)
N2A
= λ(p− cs)(1 +NApir
2/Q)e−NApir2/Q − 1
N2A
= λ(p− cs)(1 +NApir
2/Q)− eNApir2/Q
eNApir2/QN2A
= λ(p− cs)(1 +NApir
2/Q)− (1 +NApir2/Q+ (NApir2/Q)2/2 + · · · )
eNApir2/QN2A
= λ(p− cs)(−(NApir
2/Q)2/2− (NApir2/Q)3/6− · · · )
eNApir2/QN2A
≤ 0
where the before last equality follows from the Taylor expansion of eNApir
2/Q, and inequality is true if
NA > 0. The proof is completed.
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